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Introduction 
Family firms play a significant role in the global economy (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Chrisman et al., 2007) and have been recognized as “a major source of oxygen for the combustion 
of entrepreneurship” (Rogoff and Heck, 2003: 559). However, many of them are unable to access 
the resources and capabilities needed to sustain competitive advantage and to grow, while several 
others are undergoing succession without any, or any suitable or interested, family successors 
(Howorth et al., 2004; Shanker and Astrachan 1996; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003; Upton and Petty, 
2000). Opening up the family firm’s capital to private equity (PE) investors, through management 
buyouts and buyins (investments made together with existing management or with a new 
management team, respectively), is a viable solution to both of these problems. It can actually be 
the preferred route for the family, because PE is an alternative to selling out to another company or 
to going public. This has two advantages: continuity of the firm and, in some cases, sustained 
family presence in the business (Dreux, 1992; Howorth et al., 2004).  
From a PE firm’s perspective, family firms represent an important investment opportunity. 
First, family firms offer a vast potential deal pool, because they are the dominant form of economic 
enterprise throughout the world (Chrisman et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1999) and often do not have 
the necessary resources to survive or grow. Second, family business owners are moved not only by 
economic but also by noneconomic objectives, such as creating jobs for family members (Chrisman 
et al., 2004; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Sharma et al., 1997). This gives PE investors an 
opportunity to increase the firm’s value by cutting agency costs through stricter governance systems 
(Jensen, 1993), and by promoting strategic managerial innovation through changes in organizational 
structure and managerial practices (Markides, 1998; Reid, 1996). 
Given that PE firms seek to take an equity stake in potentially high growth unquoted companies 
and to obtain high returns through an IPO or a sale to other investors or industry players (Mason 
and Harrison, 1999), they need to select their investments carefully. This type of investor is 
considered to be successful at predicting performance potential (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000) and 
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bases the investment assessment on criteria that, in the strategy literature, are associated with 
superior firm performance (Shepherd, 1999). The aim of this paper is to shift the research focus 
from startups to family firms as investment targets and to assess whether the decision making 
criteria that PE investors use in selecting the latter are consistent with antecedents of firm 
performance and the presence of agency costs, as identified by family business scholars. 
Existing theory shows that performance outcomes in family firms result from the interaction of 
the business and the family (Habbershon et al., 2003). Traditionally, family firms have been 
represented through two (family and business) or three (family, ownership and managers) circle 
models (Gersick et al., 1997; Habbershon et al., 2003; Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). These overlapping 
subsystems have been helpful to describe individual and organizational behaviors, roles and 
perspectives and to explain how family relationships influence firm objectives and strategies 
(Sharma et al., 1997). Some more recent contributions to understanding family firm performance 
have come from mainstream theories. Applications of the resource based view (RBV) have 
identified sources of family firm capital leading to unique strategy making and competitive 
advantages over nonfamily firms (Habbershon et al., 2003; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Applications of 
agency theory have highlighted how asymmetric altruism can be associated with free riding and 
management entrenchment, leading to extraction of private benefits (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; 
Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Thus, greater focus on economic objectives and better monitoring can 
lead to performance improvements. 
This research is based on a conjoint experiment made up of 1312 assessments by 41 PE 
professionals working in 35 PE firms, who were asked to evaluate their likelihood of investment in 
family firms. Given that decisions are nested within individuals and that individuals are, in turn, 
nested in organizations, data were analyzed using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which 
accounts for possible autocorrelation among observations. 
The paper makes three main contributions. First, this study contributes to the family business 
literature by addressing a gap in the literature regarding nonfamily succession routes, which have 
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not been fully investigated (Howorth et al., 2004). From a family firm’s perspective, an outside 
investor can help solve succession problems when there are no (or no suitable and/or interested) 
family heirs or when some family members wish to sell their shares and exit the firm. At the same 
time, this route offers other advantages including access to funds for the firm’s growth aspirations 
and acquisition plans (in addition to, or instead of, internally generated funds), preservation of 
independent ownership of the firm (as opposed to a sale to a competitor or another industry player), 
and a chance for family members to continue being involved in the firm (Corbetta, 1995; Wright 
and Coyne, 1985). 
Second, there have been several calls for more rigorous methodological research in family firm 
studies, which still rely largely on survey methods and case studies (Chrisman et al., 2005, 2007; 
Chua et al., 2003). This paper uses a conjoint experiment, capturing real time decisions and 
avoiding the pitfalls of questionnaires, such as recall bias and post hoc rationalization (Sandberg et 
al., 1988; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). Conjoint analysis has been used in numerous studies on 
decision making, including consumer purchase choices, managers’ strategic decisions and venture 
capitalists’ selection of startups (Muzyka et al., 1996; Riquelme and Rickards, 1992; Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000). Furthermore, this is one of the first studies to apply a 
multilevel model to the family firm context, by analyzing data (decisions, nested within individuals, 
nested within firms) with HLM (Eddleston et al., 2008). This technique has previously been 
employed by scholars investigating investor decision making (Choi and Shepherd, 2004), group 
behavior (Barsade, 2002), individual performance over time (Deadrick et al., 1997), and 
organizational performance (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Hofmann, et al., 2000). 
Third, the paper contributes to investor decision making literature which, to date, has focused 
on startup selection (Franke et al., 2006; MacMillan et al., 1985; Meyer et al., 1993; Muzyka et al., 
1996; Riquelme and Rickards, 1992; Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2003; Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1981, 1984; Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 1999, 2001). Investment 
decisions in family firms have received little attention (Birley et al., 1999; Carter and Van Auken, 
 5
1994; Elango et al., 1995), despite the fact that family businesses account for a large proportion of 
investments, particularly in Europe, and are the single largest receiver of PE in some major 
European economies, including Italy, France, and the UK (CMBOR, 2005). 
The paper proceeds as follows: first, relevant family firm literature is reviewed and hypotheses 
are generated. Second, the research design is explained, including method used, sample selection, 
and data collection. Third, empirical results are presented. Finally, there is a discussion of key 
findings, followed by limitations of the study and implications for further research. 
 
1. Theory and hypotheses 
1.1. Distinctive resources in family firms 
In general, RBV scholars have highlighted the importance of resources and capabilities as key 
antecedents of a firm’s strategy and profitability. Competitive advantage has been linked to certain 
resources i.e., those that are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). 
Scholars applying RBV to family firms have stressed the importance of human resources in creating 
competitive advantage. Habbershon and Williams (1999) found that family firms have a distinctive 
bundle of resources and capabilities, which they termed familiness, resulting from the interaction 
between business and family, and leading to competitive advantage over nonfamily firms. Sirmon 
and Hitt (2003) identified the sources of family firm capital as being human capital (knowledge, 
skills and capabilities of individuals), social capital (relationships between the family on the one 
hand and stakeholders, such as suppliers and customers, on the other), and governance structure and 
costs (involvement of family owners/managers in the firm). Family ties contribute to building a 
family’s values and norms, and firm specific tacit knowledge (Lee et al., 2003; Sirmon and Hitt, 
2003). Family members generally develop close relationships with the firm’s employees (Horton, 
1986) and are able to gain in-depth understanding of their local environment, allowing them to 
identify emerging entrepreneurial opportunities more easily (Randøy and Goel, 2003). Research has 
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also found that family members are more productive than nonfamily members (Kirchhoff and 
Kirchhoff, 1987). 
However, not all family members working in a firm are valuable resources. Sometimes, they 
are chosen as a result of nepotism, birth order, or gender, rather than merit (Dyer, 1986; 2003). It is 
not easy for an outside investor to assess human capital in a target firm, since it is an intangible 
resource and there are no accepted models or methods for carrying out human capital evaluations in 
the context of PE investment (Smart, 1999). Therefore, one way of assessing family members’ 
quality is to consider whether they have previously worked outside the family firm. Past experience 
allows individuals to develop their cognitive models and helps them make more successful 
decisions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Work experience acquired outside the family firm 
increases heterogeneity of perspectives and beliefs and improves strategic decisions (Sirmon and 
Hitt, 2003). Furthermore, it makes it easier for family members to meet the high expectations of 
professionalism they need in order to be recognized as able managers by nonfamily employees 
(Aronoff, 1998; Salvato, 2004). Thus,  
H1. The likelihood of PE professionals investing in a family firm is higher if family members 
working in the firm have gained outside work experience. 
 
Family firm owners have a tendency to rely exclusively on family members because they often 
find it difficult to delegate to outsiders, have insufficient knowledge of formal management 
techniques, fear losing control, or believe that professionalization is an unnecessary cost (Dyer, 
1989; Sharma et al., 1997). In turn, nonfamily managers frequently decide to stay away from family 
firms because they are likely to offer outsiders limited potential for professional growth, restrict 
their role to that of tutor, counselor or confidant, and exclude them from succession (Chua et al., 
2003; Covin, 1994; Gallo and Vilaseca, 1998; Klein, 2000). 
However, nonfamily managers can play a critical role, as CEOs or executives, and have a 
positive impact on firm performance if they are included in strategic decision making (Chua et al., 
 7
2003; Gallo and Vilaseca, 1998). Many of them have formal business training and experience 
(Dyer, 1989), and may possess cultural competence, which helps them understand and be receptive 
to the socio-cultural configuration deriving from the family/firm interaction (Hall and Nordqvist, 
2008). Similarly to family members, nonfamily managers tend to have idiosyncratic knowledge of 
the firm (Lee et al., 2003). Additionally, they enhance heterogeneity and add new perspectives that 
are not based on the family’s experiences. Another advantage over family members is that 
professional managers are generally less invested and not tied by emotional connections to the 
family and the firm, making certain sensitive decisions less difficult (Schein, 1995; Sirmon and 
Hitt, 2003). Thus,  
H2. The likelihood of PE professionals investing in a family firm is higher if there are 
nonfamily managers. 
 
1.2. Agency costs in family firms 
According to traditional agency theory, agency costs in family firms are minimized or reduced 
to zero because principal (owner) and agent (manager) coincide (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Familiarity between principal and agent, ease of communication, and cooperation among family 
members create a convergence of interests, thus avoiding the need for formal controls and incentive 
systems. This view is reinforced by the stewardship perspective, according to which there are 
altruistic behaviors among family members deriving from an alignment of objectives between 
family members and the organization (Davis et al., 1997). This type of altruism can be an important 
resource for establishing competitive advantage, if family members are highly dedicated to the 
success of the family firm and put its interests before their own (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; 
Eddleston and Kellermans, 2007). Similar positive outcomes derive from psychosocial altruism, 
entailing the transfer of socially embedded values and norms from parents to offspring and leading 
to reciprocity, and simplified communication and decision making (Lubatkin et al., 2007). 
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Because family relationships are driven not only by economic but also by noneconomic 
objectives (Chrisman et al. 2004, Corbetta and Salvato 2004, Sharma et al. 1997), parents tend to be 
generous to their children, and family members help each other in times of need (Schulze et al., 
2003). These behaviors, however, can also lead to negative consequences and to the emergence of 
agency costs (Burkart et al., 2003; Chrisman et al., 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Morck and 
Yeung, 2003; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). First, they can be associated with unreciprocated 
generosity and manipulation on the part of some family members, leading to free riding and 
shirking. Second, if altruism is based on paternalism and if children perceive their parents as being 
coercive, offspring may rebel against their parents’ wishes, wearing down family bonds (Lubatkin 
et al., 2007).  
It is difficult to know whether stewardship or agency type relationships prevail in family firms 
(Chrisman et al., 2007). The incidence of agency costs varies from one family firm to another and 
may occur unevenly during the lifecycle of the same family firm (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). However, 
we do know that PE investors face problems of asymmetric information when they are evaluating a 
potential target firm, because these are companies that are not quoted on the stock market and for 
which little information is available (Wright and Robbie, 1998). This issue is exacerbated when the 
target is a family firm, because these firms are characterized, more than others, by high levels of 
tacit knowledge possessed by family members (Howorth et al., 2004). Given that family firms 
generally pursue both economic and noneconomic goals and that family involvement can 
potentially lead to agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004), in order to minimize their investment risk 
(Zutshi et al., 1999), PE professionals should assume that there are agency costs in the firm they are 
assessing. Furthermore, some actions are not considered to lead to agency costs in family firms 
(although they may reduce economic performance), such as an owner employing firm resources to 
pursue noneconomic goals by providing jobs for unqualified family members. However, these are 
considered to be agency problems in nonfamily firms (Chrisman et al., 2004) and are likely to be 
viewed as such by an outside PE investor.  
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Given that agency costs in family firms are associated with the family, a reduced family 
presence may therefore be an incentive to invest. First, if individuals who were previously receiving 
benefits, shirking or free riding exit the firm, the source of agency costs is removed. Second, if there 
are fewer (or no more) family members after the deal, it is easier for the PE firm to implement 
changes such as tighter monitoring, governance structures, and performance incentives (Robbie et 
al., 1999; Wright et al., 1994, 2001). Monitoring and incentive compensation have indeed been 
found to improve family firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2007). Thus,  
H3. The likelihood of PE professionals investing in a family firm is higher if there are family 
members wishing to sell their shares and exit the firm. 
 
Conflict can be another source of agency costs in family firms. Emotions are hard to avoid in 
family firms because family and business are so entangled (Boles, 1996; Harvey and Evans, 1994; 
Miller and Rice, 1998) and potential for conflict is greater than in nonfamily firms (Lee and Rogoff, 
1996). Ownership fragmentation often enhances such tension, by causing sibling rivalry and 
disagreement between old and new generations. This leads to personal conflict, goal misalignment, 
diminished loyalty, and weaker commitment to the firm (Eddleston et al., 2008; Schulze et al., 
2003). Some forms of conflict can be beneficial because they promote creativity and innovation and 
increase environment understanding and opportunity recognition. These include task conflict i.e., 
disagreement over what tasks should be pursued, and process conflict i.e., disagreement over how 
tasks should be carried out and how strategy should be implemented (Cosier and Harvey, 1998; 
Kellermans and Eddleston, 2004; 2007). However, other types of conflict, such as cognitive conflict 
concerning goals and strategies, are harmful for individual and group performance, reduce morale 
and productivity (Jehn, 1995), and are associated with declining performance in family firms or 
even family firm failure (Eddleston and Kellermans, 2007; Harvey and Evans, 1994; Olson et al., 
2003). 
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A PE investor evaluating a family firm with fragmented ownership can face two types of 
dilemmas relating to conflict. First, there can be an immediate setback, if disagreement among a 
high number of family owners, and between PE firm and family members, leads to a breakdown in 
negotiations. Second, if the deal goes through and ownership fragmentation persists, there can be 
conflict between the PE firm and remaining family owners, as well as among remaining family 
owners. Ownership fragmentation can exacerbate the information asymmetry problem among 
vendors, purchasers, and financiers, which is typical of PE deals (Howorth et al., 2004). This can 
lead to agency costs deriving from differing interests, difficulty in observing behavior and 
asymmetric information between old/new and majority/minority owners (Chrisman et al., 2004; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). There can also be difficulties in implementing the PE firm’s chosen 
strategy, mismanagement, leadership inability, and difficulties with exit (MacMillan et al., 1985). 
These problems are tricky to deal with, especially for an outsider, because sources of conflict in 
family firms are complex and rooted in history (Haynes and Usdin, 1997; Kaye, 1991). Thus,  




2. Research design 
2.1. Conjoint analysis 
Social judgment literature has highlighted the difficulties in identifying individuals’ decision 
making models. It is hard for decision makers to isolate the variables they use, identify the links 
between variables, and express the process by which they combine information into a decision 
heuristic. Furthermore, when they are asked how they have arrived at a decision, individuals are 
often inaccurate when they describe the heuristics they have used (Keats, 1991). Thus, in this study, 
it was decided to identify “theories in use” rather than to focus on “espoused theories”. Espoused 
theories are based on asking individuals to recall criteria used in their decision making or to assign 
relative importance to a list of predefined criteria. This type of retrospective reporting often causes 
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biases and errors, such as recall bias and post hoc rationalization, since it relies on self-reporting 
and subjective assessment (Sandberg et al., 1988; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). 
Theories in use, instead, are those that actually govern behavior and can be inferred from how 
individuals behave. They can be investigated through real time methods, which have the advantage 
of studying decisions as they are being made, thereby reducing reliance on respondents’ perceptual 
and cognitive skills (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). The real time method used here was conjoint 
analysis, which requires participants to evaluate hypothetical profiles of potential target firms that 
are described through combinations of different levels of criteria or attributes. By making 
judgments about varying combinations of different levels of variables, conjoint analysis allows the 
researcher to identify the relative contribution of each attribute (Hair et al., 1998). This method has 
been used in several studies on venture capitalist decision making (e.g., Choi and Shepherd, 2004; 
Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002; Shepherd et al., 2003). 
Individuals, including experts, typically use three to seven criteria to make decisions (Miller, 
1956; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). In this study, seven variables (four decision factors and three 
control variables) were chosen on the basis of an in-depth literature review and were pretested with 
a consultant working in the PE sector (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Although presenting 
variables that have already been selected and coded could remove some perceptual elements, this 
avoids time consuming activities involved in presenting extremely detailed information and letting 
respondents extract information (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). This was an advantage in this 
study, since PE investors are often reluctant to provide information on their investment activities 
(Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999) and are not willing to spend significant 
amounts of time with researchers.  
Each attribute had two levels, high/low. While this may be considered an inaccurate 
specification, because there are differences in how respondents perceive “high” or low”, it 
represents a realistic variation and range, reflecting typical decision making situations for PE 
professionals (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002). Furthermore, not 
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quantifying the factors avoids situations in which respondents might exclude certain investment 
prospects a priori (Shepherd, 1999): for example, a 5% annual industry growth can be considered 
high or low depending on the PE firm’s investment criteria. Fig. 1 provides a profile example. 
- - - Insert Fig. 1 about here - - - 
Given that there were seven variables, the total number of possible profiles was 27=128. This 
number was reduced to 16 (same number used by Brundin et al., 2008 and Shepherd, 1999), 
through fractional factorial design (Hahn and Shapiro, 1966), which gives an orthogonal design i.e., 
one in which levels of different attributes across profiles are not correlated. The 16 profiles were 
replicated in order to estimate individual subject error and assess external reliability through a test-
retest measure (Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000). The order of the 32 profiles and of the 
factors in each profile was varied across respondents to avoid order effects (Orme et al., 1997). 
Respondents also received a practice profile (which was not included in the statistical analysis), 
explaining the simulation and allowing respondents to familiarize themselves with the task 
(Shepherd et al., 2000). 
Participants were asked to fill in a post-survey questionnaire with personal details (education, 
previous work experience, etc.) and information on their PE firm (age, size, etc.). 
 
2.2. Sample 
The 2005 Italian PE Association’s membership list was used to identify potential participants 
(AIFI, 2005). Out of the 83 members, 43 PE firms were identified as possible candidates to take 
part in the research (others were excluded for various reasons e.g., they were duplicated, only 
invested in early stage, had particular investment objectives such as promoting job creation in 
underdeveloped areas, were no longer in business, etc.). In total, 35 PE firms agreed to participate 
in the study, giving a response rate of 81.4%. In five of these firms the simulation was carried out 
by two individuals, raising the final number of responses to 41. Firms that took part in the study 
were mostly independent operators (80%) and were evenly divided between local (57%) and 
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international (43%) firms. A comparison with PE firms that did not participate indicates no 
significant differences in characteristics. The 41 respondents were mostly male (93%), had a 
university degree (51%) or Master’s/MBA (49%), and typically were in senior positions such as 
President, Partner, CEO or Director (85%). On average, they were 39 years old (S.D. 7.66). Their 
PE and overall work experience was 9 years (S.D. 6.70) and 15 years (S.D. 7.80), respectively.  
 
2.3. Data collection 
Respondents were first contacted by letter and telephone and then received an instruction sheet, 
an explanation of variables and levels used, and the profiles to be evaluated. Respondents were 
asked to treat each profile as a separate situation and not to refer back to profiles they had already 
compiled. Profiles were administered mainly through face to face meetings. For practical reasons, 
for individuals who were travelling extensively, email was used with 12 respondents (29.3%). 
Previous research has found that different methods (telephone, post, email) produce relatively equal 
predictive accuracy (Shepherd et al., 2000; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2002; Zacharakis and Meyer, 
1998). Analysis of variance on the regression coefficients of responses collected through face to 
face meetings and email showed no significant differences due to form of survey administration 
(p>.05) and, consequently, data collected through both methods were aggregated for the analysis. 
 
2.4. Measures 
Respondents were asked to assess how likely they were to invest in family firms that were 
described through paper profiles (“On the basis of the following characteristics, how would you rate 
the likelihood of your investing in this investment proposal?”). 
2.4.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was the PE investors’ assessment of how likely they were to invest in a 
family firm with certain characteristics. This was an ordinal variable, measured on a seven point 
Likert scale (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992), ranging from “I would definitely not invest in this 
firm” (corresponding to a value of 1) to “I would definitely invest in this firm” (value of 7). 
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2.4.2. Independent variables 
Four decision cues were used, each with two possible levels, high or low: presence of family 
members with work experience outside the family firm, presence of nonfamily managers, presence 
of family owners who wish to exit the firm, and ownership dispersion. 
2.4.3. Control variables 
This study considers the family specific variables that affect whether family firms are selected 
for PE investment. In order to take into account the influence of variables that are not particular to 
this type of firm, three control variables were used. Prior research has indicated that industry growth 
and firm profitability are important factors in PE investment decisions (Elango et al., 1995; 
MacMillan et al., 1985; Riquelme and Rickards, 1992; Sandberg et al., 1988; Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984). Industry growth contributes to a target firm’s upside revenue potential (Robbie et al., 1999; 
Wright et al., 2001). Attractive profit levels are another key investment criterion, since past earnings 
demonstrate the ability to achieve profits in the future (Dreux, 1992). 
Because of information asymmetry problems between outside investors and firm under 
evaluation (Howorth et al., 2004; Wright and Robbie, 1998), formalization of systems and 
procedures was also used as a control variable. The presence of job descriptions, organizational 
charts, operational plans and so on allows an external investor to access information on the target 
firm more easily and limits the riskiness of the investment prospect (Baum and Wally, 2003; 
MacMillan et al., 1985). 
 
3. Data analysis and results 
The experiment generated 1312 observations i.e., 32 decisions for each of the 41 individuals. 
Because decisions are nested within individuals, who in turn are nested in organizations (35 PE 
firms), the data were analyzed using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). HLM is one of the most 
widely used multilevel techniques (Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002), which has been employed to 
investigate investor decision making (Choi and Shepherd, 2004) as well as other types of 
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entrepreneurial and strategic decisions (Barsade, 2002; Brundin et al., 2008; DeTienne et al., 2008; 
Eddleston et al., 2008). Multilevel models recognize that there may be autocorrelation in the 
decisions taken by each individual, as well as in the decisions taken by individuals belonging to the 
same organization. Also, because it does not simply aggregate individual level data to carry out 
analysis (as OLS approaches), HLM does not ignore potentially meaningful individual level 
variance in the outcome measure (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). 
HLM allows the researcher to partition the variance at each level of analysis. In this study, out 
of the total variance in investment decisions, 95.4% occurs at the decision level (level 1 or within 
individuals), 4.4% occurs at the individual level (level 2 or between individuals) and 0.2% occurs at 
the organization level (level 3 or between organizations). Results are reported in Table 1, which 
includes decision factors, coefficients, corresponding standard errors and levels of significance. 
- - - Insert Table 1 about here - - - 
Results indicate that three out of the four family-specific factors were significant, specifically 
there was a positive association between likelihood of investment and presence of experienced 
family members (coefficient=.335, p<.01), presence of nonfamily management (coefficient=.857, 
p<.01), and presence of family members wishing to exit the firm (coefficient=.369, p<.01). These 
findings provide support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The decision factor “Ownership 
Dispersion” was not significant and, therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  
Reliability was investigated through average test-retest correlation (Hardy and Bryman, 2004), 
which showed a high level of consistency in judgment, thereby addressing the potential concern of 
artificiality associated with an experimental design (Raser, 1969). Reliability was significant for 
95.1% of respondents (p<.01). Average test-retest correlation was .81, higher than Shepherd’s 
(1999) value of .69 and close to Choi and Shepherd’s (2004) value of .82. This confirms that 




4. Discussion and conclusions 
4.1. Human resources and agency costs 
This paper investigates the factors that affect PE professionals’ investment decisions in family 
firms. Two key themes emerge from this study. First, PE professionals’ decision making relies on 
the presence of intangible resources in the target firm. These include experienced family members, 
who offer human capital, tacit knowledge, and social capital as potential sources of competitive 
advantage for the firm (Horton, 1986; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003, Chrisman et al., 1998). PE investors 
also value nonfamily managers, who improve the perceived quality of the family firm’s human 
capital, by being associated with a certain level of professionalization of family firms (Dyer, 1989). 
PE professionals may also be reassured by the presence of nonfamily managers, because they can 
relate more easily with an individual they perceive as being a professional like themselves (Byrne, 
1971; Jackson et al., 1991; Turner, 1987).  
Second, there is an information asymmetry problem, which manifests itself in two ways. Since 
it is hard for an outsider to judge whether stewardship or agency type relationships prevail, PE 
investors take a “worst case scenario” and assume there are agency costs in the target firm 
(Chrisman et al., 2004). This allows them to cut slack and improve economic efficiency through 
tighter monitoring and control systems (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, given that little information is 
available on target firms, PE investors favor the presence of nonfamily managers because it signals 
that, by hiring a professional, the target firm has already demonstrated a willingness to delegate and 
to open up to outsiders.  
 
4.2. Family firms along the definitional continuum 
Given that family firms are not a homogenous group of firms but form a definitional continuum 
ranging from consolidated family ownership on one side to more hands off involvement at board 
level on the other (Corbetta, 1995; Habbershon and Williams, 1999), this study suggests that PE 
professionals prefer to invest in family firms that have already started moving along such a 
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continuum. Their decision making favors firms which have already opened up to outside 
professionals and in which some family members want to exit. The involvement of a PE firm in the 
target firm’s equity is likely to move the latter further along the definitional continuum, through 
changes in the resource pool and in the firm’s culture, management style, control system, and so on 
(Habbershon and Williams, 1999), bringing the investee firm closer to being a nonfamily firm.  
 
4.3. Implications for family firm literature 
This study has further implications for family firm literature. First, it explores a nonfamily 
route to succession, which has not received much attention in the academic literature (Birley and 
Westhead, 1990; Howorth et al., 2004). Previous family firm research has focused almost 
exclusively on internal succession (Howorth et al., 2004) and has highlighted reasons why family 
firms may not want to open their capital to outside investors. These include fear of losing control of 
the firm, not wanting to share with others the results of one’s entrepreneurial and managerial skills, 
wanting to maintain maximum freedom in negotiating the future of the firm, and fear that an outside 
investor will have a shorter time perspective than the family’s (Dreux, 1992; Poutziouris, 2001; 
Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). However, PE deals offer advantages such as allowing current family 
members to remain as owners or employees/managers, keeping the management team together, 
allowing the family to cash its investment in the firm whilst maintaining independent ownership of 
the firm, and preserving the firm’s identity and culture (Birley et al., 1999; Howorth et al., 2004; 
Wright and Coyne, 1985). In some cases, a nonfamily route may be the only one available, if there 
are no – or no suitable and/or interested – family heirs (Corbetta, 1995). In these situations, PE 
deals can offer advantages over other forms of nonfamily routes. A sale to a third party (a trade 
sale) would probably not preserve the firm’s identity and employees’ jobs, and initial public 
offerings are often out of the reach of many family firms (Howorth et al., 2004).  
Second, scholars have emphasized the need for families to evaluate, shed, acquire, and leverage 
resources in order to maintain their firms’ competitive advantage (Habbershon and Williams, 1999; 
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Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). However, this can be difficult because there are limits to human capital if 
family members are hired on the basis of nepotism, birth order, or gender (Dyer, 1986; 2003) rather 
than merit. Even when there is some form of selection, the resource pool is restricted if there is a 
policy to hire only from the family and, where such a policy does not exist, qualified professional 
managers may nevertheless stay away, because they are often excluded from succession or have 
limited potential for professional growth in the firm (Covin, 1994). Sirmon and Hitt (2003) 
identified strategic alliances as a possible solution for accessing required resources and capabilities. 
This form of collaboration among independent firms allows partners to access additional resources, 
share knowledge, and enhance technological capabilities (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Rothaermel, 
2001). However, family firm owners may not feel comfortable with strategic alliances, which 
involve sharing knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004), whereas family firms are often 
reluctant to disclose information especially with another, often competing, firm (Dreux, 1992). 
Therefore, a PE deal may be an alternative solution. PE firms can improve a family firm’s chances 
of gaining competitive advantage, by complementing the existing stock with new resources that 
were previously difficult to access. There can be a positive effect on strategic decision making by 
introducing greater heterogeneity through new human resources that are not dominated by family 
experiences and history (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Changes in the resource pool are easier 
to implement for nonfamily investors, because they do not have emotional ties to the family and are 
more objective in their decisions, without being driven by altruism or generosity (Lunati, 1997; 
Schulze et al., 2003), thereby reducing potential conflict that is typical of family relationships 
(Boles, 1996; Miller and Rice, 1998). PE firms can obtain the required resources from the market, 
thanks to their own social capital of networks and to ties with professional managers and external 
board members. Moreover, an external equity investor can manage the uncertainty that is associated 




4.4. Limitations and future research 
This study has two potential limitations relating to choice of criteria and sample size. Conjoint 
models require decision making criteria to be chosen a priori. Efforts were made to minimize this 
limitation by selecting criteria on the basis of a thorough review of family firm and startup selection 
literature. They were also pretested (Shepherd et al., 2000) with a consultant working in the PE 
sector. With regard to sample size, 41 respondents from 35 PE firms took part in the research. 
However, because a significant proportion of the PE firm population (81.4%) participated, the study 
adequately represents the population of Italian PE firms (Orme, 1998). 
Future research should expand on nonfamily routes to succession, seeing that many family 
firms are facing this process around the world (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996; Upton and Petty, 
2000) and may not be able or willing to choose a family successor. Given that an outside investor 
moves a family firm along the definitional continuum, making it less like a family firm, research 
should address the impact of these transactions both on the firms and on society. With regard to the 
former, it is generally recognized that PE transactions are associated with enhanced performance 
and productivity through changes in incentive and governance mechanisms (Cumming et al., 2007; 
Wright et al., 1992). However, a change in ownership could cause new agency issues, rather than 
solving them, if owners and managers no longer coincide or belong to the same family (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, a reduced presence of family firms can have effects on a societal 
level, given that family businesses play an important role in creating employment, generating 
innovations and improving quality of life (Astrachan, 2003; Zahra, 2005). 
Further studies could also explore how investment criteria relate to actions pursued after the 
deal has taken place, given that PE investors introduce changes in strategy, organizational structure, 
and managerial practices (Markides, 1998; Reid, 1996). For example, the study has shown that PE 
investors value some continued family involvement. However, this might just be a temporary 
situation, with the family exiting the firm completely in the medium to long term. Another avenue is 
to investigate the investors’ decision making process further, by addressing the role of intuition, 
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overconfidence and biases in PE decision making, as has been done with venture capitalists (Franke 
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